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Abstract—Emerging neural networks based machine learning
techniques such as deep learning and its variants have shown
tremendous potential in many application domains. However,
they raise serious privacy concerns due to the risk of leakage
of highly privacy-sensitive data when data collected from users
is used to train neural network models to support predictive
tasks. To tackle such serious privacy concerns, several privacy-
preserving approaches have been proposed in the literature
that use either secure multi-party computation (SMC) or ho-
momorphic encryption (HE) as the underlying mechanisms.
However, neither of these cryptographic approaches provides
an efficient solution towards constructing a privacy-preserving
machine learning model, as well as supporting both the training
and inference phases.
To tackle the above issue, we propose a CryptoNN framework
that supports training a neural network model over encrypted
data by using the emerging functional encryption scheme instead
of SMC or HE. We also construct a functional encryption scheme
for basic arithmetic computation to support the requirement of
the proposed CryptoNN framework. We present performance
evaluation and security analysis of the underlying crypto scheme
and show through our experiments that CryptoNN achieves
accuracy that is similar to those of the baseline neural network
models on the MNIST dataset.
Index Terms—neural networks; deep learning; machine learn-
ing; privacy-preserving; functional encryption; cryptography;
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging deep learning (DL) architectures such as convo-
lutional neural networks and recurrent neural networks show a
huge promise for artificial intelligence (AI) based applications.
Neural networks based machine learning techniques have suc-
ceeded in many fields including computer vision, speech/audio
recognition, etc. [1]. Training of such a neural network model
requires a huge amount of data to enable reliable predictive
analytics. Commercial AI service providers such as Google,
Microsoft, and IBM have devoted a lot of efforts to build DL
models for various intelligence applications, where the models
are trained based on data collected from their customers. Even
though the AI-based applications bring convenience to daily
life, it also raises serious privacy concerns due to the risk of
leakage of highly privacy-sensitive data. Such privacy concerns
are hindering the applicability of neural network models for
real world applications [2]–[5].
To tackle the serious privacy concerns when applying neu-
ral network models in the cloud-based applications where
users’ privacy-sensitive data such as electronic health/medical
records, location information, etc., are stored and processed, a
well designed privacy-preserving neural networks framework
is very essential so that the cloud and the data owners are not
required to reveal their models and sensitive data, respectively.
Existing privacy-preserving machine learning approaches are
essentially of two types : (i) non-crypto based approaches such
as SecureML [6], DeepSecure [5], and approaches proposed in
[4], [7], [8]; and (ii) crypto based approaches such as Cryp-
toNets [3], and approaches proposed in [9]–[15]. TABLE I
illustrates the differences among the existing solutions. Non-
crypto approaches have several limitations such as significant
communication overhead in the secure protocol based solu-
tions where a high degree of coordination and information
exchange are required [5], [6], training overhead for the data
owner [6], and utility loss [8]. Most of the existing crypto
based approaches, such as [3], [9]–[15], employ homomorphic
encryption (HE) to protect the data, where the computation
over encrypted data is allowed. As the sensitive data encrypted
by using HE can only be decrypted by the data owner,
such proposed HE-based approaches, however, only support
prediction over encrypted data using existing trained models,
rather than training a model over encrypted data. This is
because the computed results of HE is confidential to the
server, and hence cannot be used for evaluation with the
label during the back-propagation phase. That is, the machine
learning model should be trained on the plaintext data, and
then the trained model can be applied over encrypted data to
do the prediction.
Consider a computer aided diagnostic application scenario:
several distributed federal clinics want to train an AI model to
help diagnose the images generated from magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI), X-ray, etc. The limited IT infrastructure or AI
experts in such clinics means that they cannot train the model
by themselves, and hence have to rely on a third party service,
such as a cloud based machine learning service. However, the
regulations for protecting patients’ healthcare records require
a secure approach for training machine learning models on the
privacy-sensitive data collected from different federal clinics.
To the best of our knowledge, only the work proposed in [2]
supports both training and predictive analysis over encrypted
data by integrating several crypto schemes ( i.e., Quadratic
Residuosity cryptosystem, Paillier cryptosystem, and homo-
morphic encryption) with secure protocols designed for them.
However, it only supports limited types of machine learning
model as presented in TABLE I.
To tackle the challenge of training a model over encrypted
data in a simpler manner, in this paper, we propose a novel
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF PRIVACY-PRESERVING APPROACHES IN MACHINE LEARNING MODELS
Proposed Work Training Prediction Privacy . ML Model Approach
[4] • • # General Delegation‡
[7] • ◦ # Deep Learning Distributed∗
[8] • ◦ # Deep Learning Differential Privacy
SecureML [6] • • H# General Secure Protocol (SMC)
DeepSecure [5] • • H# Deep Learning Secure Protocol (Garbled Circuits)
CryptoNets [3], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15] ◦ •  Covers All Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
[2] • •  Limited ML† HE + Secure Protocol
CryptoNN (our work) • •  Neural Networks Functional Encryption
. This column indicates the privacy strength/guarantee such as mild approach # (e.g. differential privacy) and strong guarantee  (e.g. crypto system).
† It only supports Hyperplane Decision, Nave Bayes, and Decision Trees models.
‡ The data owner trains the model by itself and outsources partial computation in a privacy-preserving setting.
∗ The model is trained in a distributed manner where each data owner trains a partial model on their private data.
 It applies differential privacy method on the training data.
framework called CryptoNN, where a neural network model is
trained over encrypted data in a very simple way without the
overhead of interactive communication protocols (i.e., without
complex secure protocols), while also supporting predictive
analytics in a privacy-preserving way. The underlying crypto
scheme in our proposed CryptoNN is the emerging functional
encryption [16]. Unlike traditional encryption schemes such
as homomorphic encryption, where decryption reveals all
or nothing, in a functional encryption scheme, the decryp-
tion keys can also reveal some partial information about
the plaintext [17]. To be concrete, for a function f(·), an
authority holding a master secret key can generate a key
skf that enables the computation of the function fskf (·) on
the encrypted data. For instance, using function related key
skf the decryptor can compute fskf (x) from the encrypted
data, enc(x), without revealing the plaintext x. CryptoNN
can compute several permitted functions over the privacy-
sensitive data that is encrypted by a distributed set of data
owners, and only acquires the computed results instead of the
original plaintext data. This makes it possible to train a neural
network model over encrypted data without the overhead of the
communication protocols. The proposed CryptoNN framework
relies on a secure matrix computation scheme which is based
on existing functional encryption for the inner-product scheme
proposed by Abdalla et al. in [18] and our newly constructed
functional encryption for the basic arithmetic operations.
We summarize our key contributions as follows:
• We propose a functional encryption scheme for basic
arithmetic operations to support basic computation over
encrypted data.
• We also propose a secure matrix computation scheme,
where the elements are protected by those functional
encryption schemes.
• We propose a general CryptoNN framework built upon
the secure computation components to support the train-
ing of neural network models over encrypted data. Essen-
tially, CryptoNN inserts a secure feed-forward step and a
secure back-propagation/evaluation step into the training
phase of the normal neural network. Also, we present a
crypto-based convolutional neural network model as an
instantiation of the CryptoNN scheme.
• Finally, we analyze the security of the proposed work, and
present experiments to evaluate the performance of the
underlying secure matrix computation and the CryptoNN
schemes. We show that the accuracy of CryptoNN is
similar to that of the original NN model.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach for
training a model over encrypted data using the functional
encryption scheme.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce the background and preliminaries. We propose
our CryptoNN framework and its related secure components in
Section III. The security analysis and experimental evaluation
are presented in Section IV. We discuss the related work in
Section V and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Application Scenario
Most of the existing AI-based applications such as Google’s
Cloud AI and Microsoft’s Azure Machine Learning are built
using the cloud-client or server-client architecture, where the
client holds the data and the cloud/server is responsible for
training a machine learning model for a specific task such as
classification, regression, etc., and/or providing a predictive
analytics service for the client.
In this paper, we consider the same architecture, but with
stronger privacy guarantees as all the data owned by a client
is in an encrypted form. To be specific, in the training phase,
what the client needs to do is encrypting its sensitive data as
required and then sending it to the server. The server computes
several permitted functions over encrypted data, acquires the
computation result, and builds the final neural network model.
Similarly, the data to be used for prediction is also encrypted in
the prediction phase, and then the server outputs the prediction
using the trained model.
Note that we put more efforts in the training phase in this
paper, which is currently the biggest challenge in crypto-based
machine learning models [2]. In the prediction phase, it is still
possible to apply (i) existing homomorphic encryption (HE)
TABLE II
GENERAL NOTATIONS AND SYMBOLS IN THIS PAPER
Symbols Description
mpk The public key generated by the authority.
msk The master secret key generated by the authority.
f(·) The general function over arbitrary input.
skf The secret key related to function f(·).
[η] A set {1, 2, ..., η}.
x The bold lowercase letters denoting vectors.
X The bold uppercase letters denoting matrices.
[[d]] The cihpertext of d.
∂ The partial derivative symbol.
based approaches (e.g., CryptoNets [3], and approaches in [9]–
[15]), or (ii) our proposed functional encryption (FE) based
approach. Neither our FE based approach nor the existing HE
based approaches allow the server to learn the prediction data.
The only difference is that an HE based approach does not
allow the server to learn the prediction result, while the FE
based approach allows that. Such a setting provides flexible
choices for the client with varying levels of privacy concerns.
B. Functional Encryption
Recently proposed approaches such as those in [19]–[24],
have focused their attention on the theoretical feasibility
or existence of functional encryption, and thus constructing
schemes for general functionalities at the expense of efficiency.
In particular, those schemes rely on strong primitives such
as indistinguishable obfuscation or multilinear maps that are
prohibitively inefficient [25]. As a result, these schemes are
far from being practically deployable.
In our paper, we adopt the functional encryption approach
proposed in [18] as the basis for the matrix computation over
encrypted data. It is a simple functional encryption scheme
only supporting inner-product computation, whose security is
based on DDH assumption. Even though the functionality is
limited to inner-product computation, it is the state-of-the-
art practical construction so far. To support the element-wise
computation (i.e., product, division, addition, and subtraction),
we also propose our construction based on the same DDH
security assumption in the next section.
Here, we present the specific construction of functional
encryption for an inner product proposed in [18]. Suppose
the inner-product functionality is defined as follows:
f(x, y) = 〈x, y〉 =
η∑
i=1
(xiyi),
where η is the length of the vectors x and y. Several gen-
eral symbols and notations are presented in TABLE II. The
functional encryption scheme for the inner-product function-
ality f(x, y) is defined as FEIP = (Setup, KeyDerive,
Encrypt, Decrypt), as follows:
• Setup(1λ, 1η): The algorithm first generates two sam-
ples as (G, p, g) ←$ GroupGen(1λ), and s = (s1 , ...,
sη) ←$ Zηp on the inputs of security parameters λ and
η, and then sets mpk = (g, hi = gsi)i∈[η] and msk = s.
It returns the pair (mpk, msk).
• KeyDerive(msk, y): The algorithm outputs the func-
tion secret key skf = 〈y, s〉 on the inputs of master secret
key msk and vector y.
• Encrypt(mpk, x): The algorithm first chooses a ran-
dom r←$Zp and computes ct0 = gr. For each i ∈ [η], it
computes cti = hri · gxi . Then the algorithm outputs the
ciphertext ct = (ct0, (cti)i∈[η]).
• Decrypt(mpk, ct, skf , y): The algorithm takes the ci-
phertext ct, the public key mpk and functional key skf
for the vector y, and returns the discrete logarithm in
basis g, i.e., g〈x,y〉 =
∏
i∈[η] ct
yi
i /ct
skf
0 .
Note that even though it is impossible to recover the exponent
of generator gr in the group G according to the DDH
assumption, it is still possible to recover the inner-product
〈x, y〉 in the discrete logarithm with the same basis, g, as
〈x, y〉  r. There exists efficient approaches to computing
the discrete logarithm such as baby-step giant-step algorithm
[26]. We refer the readers to [18] for the correctness proof of
the decryption.
C. Neural Networks
A neural network usually refers to learning a model that is
a hierarchical and non-linear in structure consisting of several
layers, where each layer includes several neural units (i.e.,
artificial neurons). In a neural network, each layer receives the
data generated by its previous layer and outputs the processed
data for the next layer. In particular, the raw data is encoded
properly and fed into the first layer of a neural network, also
known as the input layer. Then, these features from the raw
data are gradually mapped to higher-level abstractions via the
iterative update (a.k.a, feed-forward and back-propagation) in
the intermediate (hidden) layers of the neural network until the
convergence condition is achieved (e.g., the specified number
of iteration). These mapping abstractions known as learned
neural network model then can be used to predict the label in
the last layer (i.e., the output layer).
With the emergence of the deep neural network (a.k.a
deep learning) techniques, several architectures have been
proposed that have been successfully used in different applica-
tion domains. For instance, the convolutional neural network
(CNN, or ConvNet) [27] is a kind of deep learning model
that is typically applied towards learning the features in the
computer vision domain. A typical CNN architecture includes
the following layer: the input layer, the convolutional layer,
the pooling layer (also known as the down-sampling layer),
activation layer (e.g., ReLU layer, sigmoid layer, etc.), fully
connected layer, and the output layer.
In this paper, we present a framework that is able to train a
neural network model over encrypted data. Here, we present
several common processing operations that are computed in
each layer or neural unit.
• Dot-product function: It is used in the general hidden
layer, where the dot-product operation needs to be exe-
cuted between the trained parameters of a specific hidden
layer and the outputs of the previous layer.
• Weighted-sum function: It is used in the convolutional
layer, where the filter or kernel (i.e., the layer’s parameter)
is convolved across the height and width of the input
volume by computing each weighted-sum of the input
and the filter matrix.
• Pooling function: It is used in the pooling layer where the
maximal/average value of some of the components of the
feeding layer is computed.
• Activation function: It is used in the activation layer,
where the computation is based on a specific activation
function such as rectified linear (ReLu) function, sigmoid
function, tanh function, etc.
• Cost function: It is used in the output layer, where the
output of the neural network model is measured by a
specified cost function with ground truth label to evaluate
the performance of the model.
III. CRYPTONN FRAMEWORK
A. Overview
The proposed CryptoNN framework includes three entities:
authority, server, and client as depicted in the Fig.1.
The authority is responsible for setting up the crypto param-
eters such as public key mpk and master secret key msk. Then
it holds the msk and distributes the public keys to the servers
and clients. Besides, it also generates the function derived key
for the server to decrypt the function result.
The client first needs to pre-process the training data as
required, and then encrypt all the pre-processed training data
using the public key, mpk. The pre-processing operation can
be quite simple. For instance, in the computer vision related
neural network model, the pretreatment involves mapping each
image into a vector. Suppose that the data is a color image with
size 28 × 28. The client needs to map all 28 × 28 × 3 pixel
values into one vector and then encrypt the vector. Similar
pretreatment and encryption are applied to the label. Once the
encrypted training data is ready, the client sends it to the server
for training a neural network model.
The server collects all the encrypted data from a distributed
set of clients. For each training iteration, the server first needs
to acquire the function derived key, skf , from the authority for
a specific function (e.g., dot-product, element-wise subtract,
etc.) representing the underlying computation between the
input layer and the first hidden layer; then it needs to decrypt
the function result and continue the process in the rest of the
hidden layers. For instance, in the the feed-forward phase, a
typical process for the first hidden layer is a = g(WX + b),
where a is the output of the layer, g is the activation function,
and b is the bias. X represents the features of samples from
the input layer, and W is the parameters of each neural node
in the first hidden layer.
In our CryptoNN framework, the input enc(X) is protected
by functional encryption scheme; thus, it is not feasible to
compute WX directly. Thus, the process needs to be trans-
ferred to
a = g(skf (W) · enc(X) + b) = g(f(WX) + b).
Even though the server does not learn the value of X, it can
compute the result (i.e., f(WX)) using the function derived
key, skf . As a result, the server can continue the feed-forward
process in the neural networks until it reaches the output layer,
where similar secure computation is applied to the encrypted
label. Note that the label Y also should be pre-processed before
encryption to prevent a direct inference attack discussed later
in Section III-B. For instance, to prevent inference, the label
should be mapped to a random number first. More details will
be discussed in Section IV-A.
Distributed data source. Our CryptoNN framework does not
limit each neural network model to correspond to only one
client. Actually, the model can be trained over multiple,
distributed data sources, where the only requirement is that
the training data should be encrypted using the same public
key.
Comparison with existing solutions. As our CryptoNN frame-
work is a crypto approach to deal with privacy issues in a ma-
chine learning model, we compare the existing homomorphic
encryption (HE) based solutions here rather than secure multi-
party computation based approaches, which will be discussed
in the related work section later.
Intuitively, both the HE-based solutions and our CryptoNN
support the computation over encrypted data, and hence, they
do not reveal the data to the server. The main difference
is that the result of the computation using HE is still in
encrypted form, while the result of the computation using
CryptoNN is plaintext. Such a difference allows CryptoNN
to do secure computation in the training phases, while other
HE-based models only support prediction over encrypted data.
Besides, the intermediate data is not ciphertext in the hidden
layers, which intuitively indicates that CryptoNN will be more
efficient than the HE-based solutions.
In the rest of this section, we first present the proposed un-
derlying crypto scheme, namely, functional encryption; then
we present the construction of the secure matrix computation
based on this functional encryption crypto-system. Finally,
we present our CryptNN framework that is built using the
proposed secure components, where a general neural network
model can be transferred to CryptoNN to enable training over
encrypted data.
B. Functional Encryption for Basic Operations
Even though the functional encryption for inner-product
can be employed to compute the dot-product over encrypted
matrix, there is still lack of functional encryption schemes
to support element-wise computation. Here, we propose our
construction of the functional encryption scheme supporting
basic operations, i.e., addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
division. Suppose the basic functionality is defined as follows:
f∆∈[+,−,∗,/](x, y) = x∆y,
where ∆ denotes the specific computation between x and y.
The functional encryption scheme for the basic functionality
f∆(x, y) is defined as FEBO = (Setup, KeyDerive,
Fig. 1. An overview of the CryptoNN framework. Note that for the demonstration purpose, we just use one image sample to illustrate the secure process of
the CryptoNN framework, as well as the one-hot encoding method for the label. Besides, as our CryptoNN framework only focuses on the data processing
which takes place between the input layer and first hidden layer in the secure feed-forward step, and between the output layer and last hidden layer in the
secure back-propagation/evaluation step, we omit the details of the neural network in the middle of hidden layers.
Encrypt, Decrypt). Each algorithm is defined as fol-
lows:
• Setup(1λ): It takes the security parameter λ as the
input, and outputs the key pair (mpk, msk). It first gen-
erates the group samples (G, p, g) ←$ GroupGen(1λ)
and randomly chooses the secret s ←$ Zp. Then, it sets
msk = s and mpk = (h, g), where h = gs.
• KeyDerive(mpk, msk, cmt, ∆, y): The algorithm takes
the master secert key, msk, the commitment, cmt, the
input of function y as the inputs and outputs the secret
key, skf∆ . The algorithm has different key generation ap-
proaches according to different arithmetic computations.
The function derived key skf∆ is generated as follows:
skf∆ =

cmts · g−y if ∆ = +,
cmts · gy if ∆ = −,
(cmts)y if ∆ = ∗,
(cmts)y
−1
if ∆ = /.
• Encrypt(mpk, x): The algorithm takes the pubic key,
mpk, and the input of function f∆ as the inputs, and
outputs a commitment, cmt, and the ciphertext of x. To
achieve that, it first randomly chooses a nonce, r ←$ Zp,
and generates the commitment cmt = gr. The ciphertext
is computed as ct = hr · gx.
• Decrypt(mpk, skf∆ , ct, ∆, y ): Based on the inputs
- the public key mpk, the function derived key skf∆ for
function f∆ with another input y, and the ciphertext ct -
the algorithm recovers the discrete logarithm in basis g
as follows:
gf∆(x,y) =

ct/sk if ∆ = + or −,
(ct)y/sk if ∆ = ∗,
(ct)y
−1
/sk if ∆ = /.
As we explained in Section II-B, it is practical to recover the
exponent, i.e., the result of f∆(x, y).
Correctness. For all (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1λ), all x, y ∈
Zp, ∆ ∈ [+,−, ∗, /], for skf∆ ← KeyDerive(msk,
cmt, ∆, y), and cmt,ct ← Encrypt(mpk, x), we have
Decrypt(mpk, skf∆ , ct, ∆, y) computed as follows:
ct/sk = (hrgx)/((gr)sg(∓y)) = gx±y if ∆ = ±,
(ct)y/sk = (hrgx)y/(gr)sy = gxy if ∆ = ∗,
(ct)y
−1
/sk = (hrgx)(y−1)/(gr)sy
−1
= gx/y if ∆ = /.
Remark. The construction of FEBO is derived from ElGa-
mal encryption [28]. The security proof of FEBO scheme is
presented in Section IV-A. The FEBO scheme can resist an
attacker (i.e., unauthorized user without function key) trying
to break the encrypted data, but cannot prevent the direct
inference attack, where the attacker (i.e., authorized decryptor
with function key) can infer the encrypted data Enc(x) using
the final function result f(x∆y) and its own y in the four
basic arithmetic computations. The issue will be addressed at
the construction of framework level components.
C. Secure Matrix Computation
Matrix computation is the basic operation in the training
and prediction phases of neural networks. To support matrix
computation over encrypted data, we construct an encrypted
matrix computation method, called secure matrix computation
in the rest of the paper, by employing the functional encryption
for inner-product proposed in [18] and our proposed functional
encryption for the basic operations presented in Section III-B.
Suppose that we need to compute a function f ∈ F , where
F is the permitted set of functions over encrypted matrix X
and Y that come from the client and the server, respectively.
The permitted function set includes dot-product and element-
wise arithmetic computation. The specific scheme is presented
in Algorithm 1.
The scheme includes three parts: pre-process-encryption
function, pre-process-key-derivative function, and secure-
computation function. As a client, it just needs to encrypt the
matrix using the pre-process-encrypt function and send out
the ciphertext (lines 14-21). For the server, it first needs to
decide the specific function f ∈ F , and then request/prepare
the function derived key skf from the authority (lines 25-30).
Algorithm 1: secure matrix computation scheme
Input: X, Y, a permitted function f ∈ F over encrypted matrix.
Output: Computation result Z and pre-process result [[x]], [[X]], skf .
1 The authority initializes and distributes public key mpkFEIP,mpkFEBO
2 function secure-computation([[x]], [[X]], f, F , skf,y/Y, Y)
3 initialize an empty matrix Z
4 if f ∈ F and f is dot-product then
5 for i← 0 to size of skf,y do
6 y := i-th row of Y
7 for j ← 0 to size of [[x]] do
8 Z[i][j] := FEIP.Decrypt(mpkFEIP,x[j],skf,y[i],y)
9 else
10 for i← 0 to row of [[X]] do
11 for j ← 0 to column of [[X]] do
12 Z[i][j] := FEBO.Decrypt(mpkFEBO,skf,Y[i][j],
[[X]][i][j],F ,Y[i][j])
13 return Z
14 function pre-process-encryption(X)
15 initialize an empty list [[x]] and an empty matrix [[X]]
16 for i← 0 to column size of X do
17 x := i-th column of X
18 [[x]][i] := FEIP.Encrypt(mpkFEIP,x)
19 for j ← 0 to row size of X do
20 [[X]][j][i] := FEBO.Encrypt(mpkFEBO,X[j][i])
21 return [[x]], [[X]]
22 function pre-process-key-derivative(Y, f,F )
23 initialize an empty list skf,y and matrix skf,Y
24 for i← 0 to row size of Y do
25 if f ∈ F and f is dot-product then
26 y := i-th row of Y
27 skf,y[i] := skf from authority by y
28 else
29 for j ← 0 to column size of Y do
30 skf,Y[i][j] := skf from authority by Y[i][j]
31 return skf,y or skf,Y
When the encrypted data from the clients and the function
derived key are ready, the server starts the processing over
encrypted data using secure-computation function as described
in lines 2-13.
Note that even though the secure dot-product computation
can also be achieved using secure element-wise multiplication
method in our proposed scheme, we still separate it as an in-
dependent function here due to efficiency considerations. The
related analysis is presented in Section IV. For simplicity, we
just use the 2-dimensional array (i.e., matrix) to demonstrate
the secure computations in the neural network model. Such a
design is similar to the setting in the NumPy, which is the most
widely used library for the scientific computing in the machine
learning area. Note that the underlying decryption involves
time-consuming operations in the secure computation scheme;
however, our scheme also supports parallel computation. For
instance, it just needs to make decryption code segment (line
8 and line 12) parallelized. Our experiments show that the
parallelization will increase the efficiency significantly (see
Section IV for more details).
Algorithm 2: The CryptoNN framework
Input: The encrypted training data [[x]] and label [[Y]], the layers
information L, the hyperparameters H, the permitted function
set F over encrypted data.
Output: the trained parameters P .
1 function CryptoNN( [[x]], [[Y]], L, H, F )
2 P ← initialize parameters according to L
3 foreach iterator in total iterations do
4 skF,P[1] ← pre-process-key-derive(P [1], F )
5 RX ← secure-computation([[x]], F , skF,P[1] , P [1])
6 A ← normal feed-forward process using RX , P
7 skF,A[l] ← pre-process-key-derive(A[l], F )
8 RA[l] ← secure-computation([[Y]], F , skF,A[l] , A[l])
9 cost C ← cost evaluation using RA[l] ,A on the cost function
10 grads G ← normal back-propagation using RA[l] ,A,H
11 P ← update parameters using existing P , and G,H
12 return P
D. CryptoNN Framework
The proposed CryptoNN framework is built on the secure
matrix computation scheme and its underlying functional
encryption schemes. As shown in Algorithm 2, we present
the general CryptoNN. As the training data is encrypted, the
CryptoNN framework inserts two rounds of secure computa-
tions presented in Section III-C to deal with the computation
between the parameters and the encrypted data (i.e., lines 4-5
and lines 7-8) for each iteration. Such two rounds of secure
computation only take place at the beginning of feed-forward
processing and back-propagation processing, and hence, they
are called secure feed-forward and secure back-propagation
and evaluation, respectively, in the rest of the paper (see Fig.1
as the example).
Scalability. CryptoNN is adaptive to any existing neural
network model if the secure feed-forward and secure back-
propagation / evaluation steps in such models can be narrowed
down to process the basic matrix computation supported by
the permitted function set F . As we cannot enumerate all
the existing neural network models to explain the general
applicability of our proposed CryptoNN, here, we first use
a simple neural network model for a binary classification task
for illustration. Then, we present a concrete case: applying the
proposed CryptoNN framework to the typical Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) in the next section.
Suppose the secure feed-forward step of the model com-
putes
A = θ(Z) = θ(WX + b),
where θ(·) is a sigmoid function θ(z) = 11+e−z and A is
the output of the layer. The process in the secure back-
propagation/evaluation step of the model includes the sigmoid
function for the output layer, and the cost function is
E =
1
2
∑
i
(yˆ(i) − y(i))2,
where yˆ(i) is the prediction and y(i) is the label. The secure
feed-forward process can be split into two steps: (i) com-
puting WX first, which is a dot-product supported by the
secure matrix computation scheme; and then (ii) computing
the remaining parts of the formula. For secure evaluation, it
can compute Yˆ − Y first, which is element-wise subtraction
also supported by CryptoNN. To update the parameter for
secure back-propagation we need to compute ∂E∂W according to
gradient descent method. Based on the partial derivative rule,
we know that
∂E
∂W
=
∂E
∂A
· ∂A
∂Z
· ∂Z
∂W
,
such that,
∂Z
∂W
= A[l−1],
∂A
∂Z
= A[l](1− A[l]), ∂E
∂A
= A[l] − Y,
where A[l−1] is the output of the last hidden layer, and Yˆ =
A[l] is the output (prediction) of the output layer. Obliviously,
the computation related to label Y is the basic element-wise
subtraction that is also supported by CryptoNN.
Prediction. We do not present the details of the prediction
(or inference) phase of the CryptoNN framework here, as the
prediction can be viewed as the sub-process of the training
phases. To be specific, the prediction phase only covers the
secure feed-forward and normal feed-forward, and gets the
output of the neural network model. As the trained model of
CryptoNN is also plaintext, it can also be integrated with exist-
ing homomorphic encryption-based solutions at the prediction
phase. Hence, it provides a flexible choice of privacy setting,
namely, keeping the predicted label confidential or not. If the
user prefers the confidential predicted label, the HE-based
prediction is employed; otherwise, the FE-based prediction can
be applied.
E. A Concrete Case: CryptoCNN
Here, we use another concrete and relatively more com-
plicated neural network model, namely, LeNet-5, a classic
convolutional neural network [29] for multiple classification,
to illustrate the scalability of CryptoNN.
Except for the input and output layer, the LeNet-5 model
includes five hidden layers: convolutional layer (C1), the
average pooling layer (S2), the convolutional layer (C3), the
average pooling layer (S4) and fully connected layer (C5).
As our CryptoNN only focuses on the secure feed-forward
and secure back-propagation / evaluation steps in the model,
we need to focus on the C1 and the output layers. To be
concrete, we need to address the padding and convolution
operations in the secure feed-forward step, and softmax output
function, softmax cross-entropy loss function in the secure
back-propagation/evaluation step.
1) secure feed-forward step: It takes place in the first
convolutional layer. As depicted in Fig.2, we illustrate classic
padding and convolution operations. Typically, the original
image is surrounded by zero-padding data if the padding is
required in the CNN model. Next, a sliding window with the
same size of the filter (a.k.a. kernel) is set to capture parts
of the image, and then next step is to do the convolution
with the filter to fill the corresponding element in the output
volume. In particular, the computation is the sum of element-
wise product of each corresponding element in the two matrix,
Fig. 2. An illustration of padding and convolution operations in the CNN
model. Suppose that the original image size is 5 × 5 × 1, and the padding
is 1. The filter size is 3 × 3 × 1. The stride is 2, hence, the output size is
3× 3× 1.
namely, aij =
∑
i,j(tijkij), where tij and kij are the elements
from the window and filter volume, respectively. The sliding
window will keep moving according to the stride length.
In the CryptoNN framework, the original image (i.e., train-
ing data) is pre-processed under the protection of functional
encryption. Thus, the padded image will be a “mixed” matrix,
as depicted in Fig.2, where the yellow element is the encrypted
data, while the green element is the plaintext zero-padding
data. When doing the convolution, there are two types of slid-
ing windows: fully encrypted window and partially encrypted
window, e.g., t11 and t00, respectively, as shown in Fig.2.
To tackle such an issue, we present the secure convolution
computation scheme, as shown in Algorithm 3. In essence,
it is similar to the secure matrix computation scheme, as the
convolution operation of two matrices can be converted to the
computation of dot-product of two vectors. As the architecture
is fixed in the adopted CNN model, the client needs to learn the
padding strategy and the filter size from the server, and then
pre-process the training data according to the filter size (lines
9-16). The server first prepares the key skf,K based on the
filter K (lines 17-20), and then executes the secure convolution
operation for the corresponding filter/kernel (lines 2-8). Note
that we only present the one-filter case in the algorithm, it is
obviously applicable to multi-filter case.
2) secure back-propagation/evaluation step: It takes place
at the output layer. We assume that the output is the softmax
function, namely, pi = e
ai∑N
k=1 e
ak
, where pi denotes the
probability of data x belonging to the class i, and N denotes
the total number of categories. Here, ai is the element of the
output vector a of the fully connected layer for data x. Also,
suppose that the label y is encoded as a vector y using the
one-hot method. Thus, the cross-entropy loss is
L = −
N∑
i=1
yilogpi,
where yi is the component of label y and pi is the component
of output vector p of the softmax function.
In the CryptoNN framework, y is encrypted using func-
tional encryption. However, obliviously, the loss function
L = −〈y,p′〉 is a kind of inner-product computation that is
Algorithm 3: secure convolution scheme
Input: training data X, filter K, a permitted function f ∈ F over
encrypted matrix, public parameter mpkFEIP
Output: the result Z.
1 Server prepare the skf,K for element-wise product for filter K
2 function secure-convolution(T, skf,K, K)
3 initialize an empty matrix Z
4 foreach element [[t]] in T do
5 k ← transfer K to vector
6 t := FEIP.Decrypt(mpkFEIP, skf,k, [[t]], f, F , k)
7 fill t into Z at right position
8 return Z
9 function pre-process-encryption(X)
10 initialize an empty window list T
11 X
′ ← X with padding
12 repeat
13 t ← abstract window matrix from X′ and transfer to vector
14 append FEIP.Encrypt(mpkFEIP, t) into T
15 until slide window finished;
16 return T
17 function pre-process-key-derivative(K, f,F )
18 k ← transfer K to vector
19 skf,K := request key from authority by k
20 return skf,K
supported by CryptoNN, where p
′
is the logarithmic vector of
p.
To do secure back-propagation for the parameter update, it
needs to compute
∂L
∂aj
=
∂L
∂pi
∂pi
∂aj
.
Briefly, we can calculate the partial derivative of ∂pi∂ai first and
the result is
∂pi
∂aj
=
{
pi(1− pj) if i = j,
−pjpi if i 6= j.
Then, ∂L∂aj = pi − yi, and the vectorized expression for all
labels is ∂L∂A = P − Y. The computation related to label Y is
the basic element-wise subtraction that is also supported by
CryptoNN.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
A. Security Analysis
The Discrete Diffie-Hellman assumption. Suppose that the
group triplet (G, p, g) is generated by a PPT algorithm with
the security parameter 1λ, where G is the group of a λ-bit
prime order p, and g is the generator. The Discrete Diffie-
Hellman assumption states that the tuples (g, ga, gb, gab) are
computationally indistinguishable from (g, ga, gb, gc), where
{a, b, c} ∈ Zp are chosen independently and uniformly at
random.
Theorem 1 establishes the security of FEBO scheme.
Theorem 1. If the Discrete Diffie-Hellman problem is hard
(i.e., DDH assumption holds), the constructed FEBO scheme
has selective security against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-
CPA).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists
an adversary A that can break the IND-CPA security of FEBO
scheme with non-negligible advantage.
Given the adversary A that runs in time t and has advantage
, we can construct an adversary B for the DDH problem that
runs in time t + O(1) and also has the advantage . Then
B(g, h1 = ga, h2 = gr, h3 = gc) is constructed as follows: (i)
set the mpk as (g, h1), b←$ {0, 1}, and ciphertext as (h2, h3 ·
gx∆y); (ii) run A(mpk,c) to get the output b′ ; (iii) if b = b′ ,
B guesses it as the valid DDH tuple; otherwise, B guesses it
is the random DDH tuple. If c = ra, then the ciphertext is
a legitimate encryption of gx∆y . If c is uniformly distributed,
independent of a and r, then the ciphertext is just the original
output. This makes B a perfect simulator of a random oracle in
this case. Thus, B also has the advantage  to break the DDH
assumption, which violates our security assumption. Thus, the
adversary A does not have the non-negligible advantage to
break the FEBO scheme.
As the FEIP scheme has been employed in the work
proposed in [18], where the security proof has been presented,
we do not provide related security analysis here.
Security analysis of CryptoNN. The underlying crypto scheme
of CryptoNN is the functional encryption scheme, for which
the security has been explained above. Here, we present the
security analysis of CryptoNN at a high level. The authority
is the third party trusted authority and is supposed to be
not in collusion with anyone. From the perspective of the
server, it can only acquire the mapping relationship between
the training data and the label, where the original training/label
data collected from multiple data sources is protected by the
functional encryption. Even for the simple label that has high
similarity, for instance, one label maps to a set of training data,
the encrypted result is uniformly distributed in the ciphertext
space at random for each same label. Thus, such mapping
relationship does not reveal any private information.
The fact that the output of the secure feed-forward and
secure back-propagation steps is the plaintext also indicates
a trade-off problem. On the one hand, it will increase the
efficiency of training a neural network model. On the other
hand, the output of the first hidden layer may include the
intermediate data that can be used to infer partial information.
A pre-processing approach such as a randomly mapping as
mentioned in Section III can avoid the direct inference for
the label, while the inner-product result cannot be used to
directly infer the factor. In addition, we also assume that the
server is not an active attacker that will collect “representative
plaintext dataset” for the encrypted training data. Thus, the
attack approaches as proposed in [30], [31] is not applicable
in our designed framework. Besides, the content related to
complex inference attack such as measuring neural network
memorization and extracting secrets is beyond the scope of
this paper. We refer the reader to [32] for more details and
corresponding countermeasures.
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Fig. 3. The time cost of element-wise addition in secure matrix computation scheme.
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Fig. 4. The time cost of element-wise multiplication in secure matrix computation scheme.
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Fig. 5. The time cost of dot-product in secure matrix computation scheme.
B. Performance Evaluation
1) Prototype implementation and test platform: To verify
the functionality and evaluate the performance, we implement
a prototype of the CryptoNN framework. The underlying
crypto system is implemented using the Charm library [33].
Charm is a Python-based crypto toolkit and its underlying nu-
merical calculations rely on GMP library. The neural network
model is implemented using Numpy , a scientific computation
library.
The test platform is a personal computer with Intel Core i7
processor, 16GB memory and macOS. Note that the training
process of the model only relies on the CPU. In all the
experiments, the security parameter is set to 256-bit. The time
measurement for program execution is based on the built-in
time package of python.
2) Performance of secure matrix computation: We evaluate
the performance of the secure matrix computation scheme over
the simulated encrypted data. Due to consideration of page
limitation, although the scheme supports several arithmetic
computations, we only present the evaluation result of three
typical arithmetic computations, namely, element-wise addi-
tion, element-wise product, and dot-product. The execution
times of those operations are depicted in Fig.3, Fig.4 and Fig.5.
Specifically, the plaintext matrix is generated randomly in
a specific range, as described in the legend of each figure. We
measure the pre-processing times for encryption, generating
function derived key, and the final secure computation, which
are executed by the client, authority, and server, respectively.
As depicted in Fig.3a and Fig.4a, the encryption time is
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Fig. 6. Comparison of average batch accuracy between original LeNet-5 and
CryptoCNN.
TABLE III
THE ACCURACY AND TRAINING TIME
model epoch 1 (acc) epoch 2 (acc) training time
LeNet-5 93.04% 95.48% 4h
CryptoCNN 93.12% 95.49% 57h
nearly linear to the element size in the matrix, where the x-
axis represents the element size (k), and the y-axis denotes
the processing time in ms. Similarly, the execution time of
pre-processing for the function derived key and element-wise
computation also has a linear characteristic. As shown in
Fig.3c, Fig.4c, and Fig.5c, the secure element-wise and dot-
product computation are time-consuming. To tackle that issue,
we apply parallelization technique in the implementation.
As shown in Fig.3d, Fig.4d, and Fig.5d, the parallelization
technique makes secure computation more practical, where the
execution time of secure dot-product can be reduced from near
90 mins to 8 seconds.
Communication overhead of key generation. Suppose that for
training a two-class classification NN model with k units in
the first hidden layer, the data set is Xm×n, where m is sample
size and n is feature size. For each training iteration, the server
sends k × n× |w| to the authority and acquires the key with
size of k× |sk|, where |w| and |sk| are the size of one weight
parameter and derivative key, respectively.
3) Performance of CryptoNN: We implement an instance
of the CryptoNN framework, namely, CryptoCNN model, as
described in Section III-E. The model is built on the LeNet-
5 architecture. We train the model on the classic MNIST
dataset [34] including a training set of 60000 examples,
and a test set of 10000 examples, and then compare the
performance on the test set. Note that since the underlying
functional encryption does not support floating point number
computation and has lower efficiency on integers with longer
lengths, we discard some precision on the parameter. For
instance, for a floating point parameter, we only keep two-
decimal places approximately and then transfer the floating
point number to the integer for the underlying crypto related
computation. Here, we only train two epochs using stochastic
gradient descent method, where the batch size is set to 64. The
comparison of the accuracy and total training time is shown in
TABLE III. Also, the average batch accuracy of each model
is depicted in Fig.6. We can conclude that CryptoCNN has
similar accuracy compared to the original model, while the
training time is much longer than the original model due to
the time-consuming cryptographic computations.
V. RELATED WORK
Functional Encryption. The concept of functional encryption
was proposed by Amit Sahai and Brent Waters in [35],
and the formal definition was presented by Boneth et al. in
[16]. As a new technique for public-key cryptography [17],
functional encryption can be viewed as the abstraction of
most of the existing encryption schemes such as attribute-
based encryption [36], inner production function [37], and
order-revealing encryption [38]. Generally, unlike traditional
encryption schemes, where decryption reveals all or nothing,
in a functional encryption scheme, the decryption keys may
reveal only partial information about the plaintext, for instance,
a computed result of a specific function.
Several constructions of functional encryption has been
proposed in the literature to deal with different functions
such as inner-product [25], comparing the order [16], and
access control [39]. On the other hand, researchers also
have focused on the functional encryption construction using
different existing techniques such as multi-party computation
[40] and multilinear maps [23], [24], or using functional
encryption to construct other cryptographic schemes such as
indistinguishablility obfuscation [22] and program obfuscation
[23]. However, most of these schemes are in theoretical
stages and not practical enough for applications. Recently,
more progressive approaches such as multi-input functional
encryption [19], functional encryption using Intel SGX [41]
and practical implementation [18], [25] have been proposed.
To achieve secure function computation, the work proposed in
[18] is one of the underlying crypto systems in our proposed
CryptoNN framework.
Secure Machine Learning. The development of machine learn-
ing techniques, especially the emerging deep learning ap-
proaches [1], [27] have enabled applications to be more
intelligent than before. The combination of machine learning
and security study can be seen in two directions: (i) security
issues in artificial intelligence, and (ii) artificial intelligence
for increasing the capability of existing security mechanisms
[42]. A series of secure or privacy-preserving machine learning
models have been proposed in [2]–[15]. Note that we only
cover the discussion about the privacy-preserving machine
learning models, rather than other security issues in AI such
as adversary machine learning.
Most of the existing privacy-preserving approaches adopt
either secure multi-party computation protocol (e.g., [5], [6])
or homophobic encryption (such as [3], [9]–[15]). Neither
of them supports training the machine learning model over
encrypted data, except for the solution proposed in [2], where
the solution only supports limited machine learning model and
also relies on the homomorphic encryption and the associated
secure protocol designed. To address the gap of training a
machine learning model over encrypted data, our proposed
CryptoNN focuses on training a secure deep learning model
over the data encrypted using functional encryption scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
Emerging neural networks based machine learning models
such as deep learning and its variants have shown tremen-
dous potential for many application domains that rely or use
huge amounts of users’ privacy sensitive data. To tackle the
serious privacy concerns of the collected data, several privacy-
preserving machine learning approaches that use either secure
multi-party computation or homomorphic encryption as the
underlying mechanisms have been proposed in the literature.
In this paper, we have proposed a novel CryptoNN framework
to support the training of neural networks over encrypted data
using emerging functional encryption schemes. The security
analysis and performance evaluation show that CryptoNN
achieves the privacy goal, as well as model accuracy. One
future direction is to explore the scalability of our CryptoNN
framework for more complex datasets, and various other neural
network models. Another future work is the use of different
hardware support for CryptoNN.
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